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Abuse Under the Big Top:
Seeking Legal Protection for Circus
Elephants after ASPCA v. Ringling
Brothers
ABSTRACT
The Asian elephants featured in the Ringling Brothers and
Barnum & Bailey Circus are theoretically guaranteed humane
treatment by the Animal Welfare Act, which ostensibly protects
animals in exhibition, and by the Endangered Species Act, which
covers the treatment of animals designated endangered species,
including Asian elephants. Nevertheless, circus elephants have
suffered extensive abuse because the agencies responsible for
implementing the laws-the United States Departments of Agriculture
and the Interior, respectively-have not done so aggressively, and
because animal advocates have been unable to compel their
enforcement or to establish standing to sue private parties. In 2000,
animal welfare organizations, including the American Society for
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, invoked the citizen-suit provision of
the Endangered Species Act to sue Ringling for alleged violations of the
Act. Joined by former Ringling "barn man" Tom Rider, the plaintiffs
survived the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of constitutional
standing by claiming that Ringling's treatment of its elephants caused
Rider emotional harm. Ultimately, nine years after the plaintiffs filed
their complaint, the court dismissed the case without reaching the
merits of the abuse claims. Characterizing Rider as a paid plaintiff,
the court determined he could not prove an emotional attachment to
Ringling's elephants or that the court could redress his alleged injury.
This Note examines the statutory enforcement gaps highlighted
by the Ringling litigation and proposes strategies for closing those gaps
with legislation and litigation. After exploring the statutory backdrop
against which the Ringling case arose and evaluating the successes
and failures of the lawsuit, this Note suggests amending the Animal
Welfare Act to ensure its diligent enforcement. Proposed changes
include adding guidelines that would constrain the broad enforcement
discretion the Secretary of Agriculture currently exercises and
supplementing the Act with a limited citizen-suit provision. This Note
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also recommends the enactment of state anti-cruelty laws that would
prohibit certain circus training tools-such as the bull hook. As the
Ringling litigation demonstrated, animal advocates face a formidable
hurdle-constitutional standing-when suing on behalf of animals. As
such, this Note advocates further strategic litigation, implementing two
promising standing theories: informational injury and economic harm
to an organization.
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The Asian elephants used in the Ringling Brothers and
Barnum & Bailey Circus (Ringling) are theoretically guaranteed
humane treatment by the Animal Welfare Act (AWA),1 which governs
the treatment of animals in exhibition, and by the Endangered Species
Act (ESA), 2 which governs the treatment of animals designated
endangered species, including Asian elephants.3 Nevertheless, circus
1. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2010) (originally enacted as Laboratory
Animal Welfare Act).
2. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2010).
3. Id.; ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2009); Endangered
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2010), available at http://ecos.
fws.gov/tess-public/SpeciesReport.do.
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elephants have been subjected to extensive abuse4 because the
agencies responsible for implementing the laws have not aggressively
enforced them,5 and because animal advocates have been unable to
compel enforcement or to establish standing to sue private parties.6
Over the course of a ten-year litigation (culminating in a six-
week non-jury trial in December 2009) animal welfare advocates,
including the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (ASPCA), sought to enjoin Ringling and its parent company
Feld Entertainment, Inc. (Feld)-owners of the largest group of
captive Asian elephants in the United States-from abusing their
elephants.7 Although the plaintiffs eventually lost on constitutional
standing grounds, the litigation succeeded in illuminating short-
comings in the statutory framework governing the treatment of circus
elephants, demonstrated the difficulties associated with invoking
statutory protections for animals through litigation, and increased
public awareness regarding circus elephant abuse.8
This Note examines the successes and failures of ASPCA's suit,
under ESA, against Ringling and Feld and proposes solutions for
closing the gaps in circus elephant protection exposed by the case.
Part I examines the legal framework under which the suit arose and
presents evidence of elephant abuse. Part II observes the enforcement
gaps in AWA and analyses the successes and failures ASPCA met by
suing Ringling and Feld under ESA. Part III explains how animal
advocates may achieve effective legal protection for circus elephants
through state and federal legislation and additional strategic
litigation.
4. ASPCA, GOVERNMENT SANCTIONED ABUSE: HOW THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE ALLOWS RINGLING BROTHERS CIRCUS TO SYSTEMATICALLY MISTREAT
ELEPHANTS (2003) [hereinafter ASPCA Report], available at http://www.awionline.org/
www.awionline.org/wildlife/elephants/fullrpt.pdf (analyzing USDA inspection documents
regarding Ringling's abuse of its elephants).
5. See id.
6. E.g., Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Animal
Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 943 F. Supp. 44, 63 (D.D.C. 1996).
7. Performing Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, No.
1:00CV01641, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12203 (D.D.C. Jun. 29, 2001), rev'd sub nom. ASPCA v.
Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003), judgment for
defendants sub nom. Feld Entm't, 677 F. Supp. 2d 55.
8. Id.
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I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND VIOLATIONS AT THE CIRCUS
A. The Animal Welfare Act
In 1966, Congress enacted the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, 9
the first federal law protecting research animals in the United
States.10 Renamed the Animal Welfare Act, in 1970 Congress
amended the Act to extend its protections to animals used "for
exhibition purposes."" In its expanded form, the statute purports to
guarantee the "humane care and treatment"12 of a wide array of
animals, including those employed in "carnivals, circuses, and zoos." 13
Regulations promulgated under the Act by the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) require that covered animals be
handled in a manner that does not "cause trauma, . . . behavioral
stress, physical harm, or unnecessary discomfort," 14 and that physical
abuse not be used to "train, work, or otherwise handle animals."15
Additionally, exhibited animals must have sufficient space "to make
normal postural and social adjustments with adequate freedom of
movement." 16
The Act's grant of broad enforcement discretion to the
Secretary of Agriculture, however, undermines the laudable mandates
of AWA.17  In addition to authorizing the Secretary to license
exhibitors18 and promulgate regulations, 19 the Act provides the
Secretary with discretion to "make such investigations or inspections
as he deems necessary" to determine whether the statute or
regulations are being violated. 20 As he sees fit, the Secretary may
suspend or revoke exhibition licenses, 21  institute criminal
9. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2010) (originally enacted as Laboratory
Animal Welfare Act); SONIA S. WAISMAN, PAMELA D. FRASCH & BRUCE A. WAGMAN, ANIMAL LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 374 (Gary J. Simson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006).
10. Benjamin Adams & Jean Larson, Legislative History of the Animal Welfare Act-
Introduction, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LIBRARY, http://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/pubs/AWA2007/
intro.shtml (last modified Feb. 17, 2010).
11. 7 U.S.C. § 2131; WAISMAN, FRASCH & WAGMAN, supra note 9, at 374.
12. 7 U.S.C. § 2131.
13. Id. § 2132(h).
14. Handling of Animals, 9 C.F.R. § 2.131(b)(1) (2010).
15. Id. § 2.131(b)(2)(i).
16. Space Requirements, 9 C.F.R. § 3.128 (2010).
17. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2149 (permitting, but not requiring, the Secretary to suspend
licenses or assess civil penalties).
18. Id. § 2133.
19. Id. § 2151.
20. Id. § 2146.
21. Id. § 2149(a).
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prosecutions, 22 assess civil fines, and issue cease-and-desist orders. 23
Because the statute lacks a citizen-suit provision, which would enable
private parties to bring claims under the Act, 24 and courts have
refused to imply such a private cause of action,25 the Secretary's
enforcement discretion is essentially unchecked.
As a result of the Secretary's extensive discretion, AWA's
humane mandates often go unenforced. 26 An ASPCA report analyzing
USDA documents obtained pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) presents multiple examples of lenient USDA
enforcement. 27  In one case, USDA investigators responding to
allegations of elephant abuse brought by a former Ringling employee
made an announced visit to a Ringling facility, where they observed a
bloody hole above one elephant's ear28 consistent with a bull hook
puncture wound. 29 Although investigators also recorded testimony of
witnesses describing beatings of multiple elephants, 30  the
investigation closed with no action due to "insufficient evidence." 31
Seven months later, one of the subjects of the closed investigation, a
baby elephant named Benjamin, suffered a heart attack while
swimming and drowned. 32  Benjamin had no preexisting heart
condition. 33 Witnesses informed a USDA investigator that Benjamin
repeatedly swam away from his trainer when "poked" with the bull
hook.34 The investigator recommended charging Ringling with AWA
violations, concluding that "the elephant seeing and/or being 'touched'
or 'poked' by [the trainer] caused behavioral stress and trauma which
22. Id. § 2149(c).
23. Id. § 2149(b).
24. See, e.g., Int'l Primate Protection League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799
F.2d 943, 939 (4th Cir. 1986); Performing Animal Welfare Soc'y v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 95-
4719, 1996 WL 524333, at *2 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 9, 1996).
25. Id.
26. See ASPCA Report, supra note 4, at i-ii ("[Tihe U.S. Department of Agriculture ...
routinely looks the other way when the Ringling Brothers [and] Barnum [&] Bailey circus beats
and otherwise mistreats the elephants in its circus," and when the USDA fails to enforce the
AWA, "it makes a mockery of the statute's intent to protect animals from inhumane treatment");
Joseph Mendelson, III, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of Standing Under the Animal
Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795, 795-96 (1997) (concluding that "there is a general
consensus that the statute has failed to fulfill its potential in fostering the humane treatment of
animals," which has been attributed, inter alia, to "inadequate regulatory implementation by the
United States Department of Agriculture").
27. APSCA Report, supra note 4, at ii.
28. Id. at 29.
29. Id. at 31-32
30. Id. at 30.
31. Id. at 38.
32. Id. at 103.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 101, 111.
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precipitated in the physical harm and ultimate death of the animal."35
Nevertheless, the agency closed the case without addressing the
investigator's conclusions, 36 finding an "insufficient basis to support
prosecution." 37
B. The Endangered Species Act
ESA protects endangered animals by prohibiting the "taking"
of any member of an endangered specieS38-including any such animal
held in captivity 39-and by authorizing any person to bring a civil suit
to enjoin alleged violations of the Act. 40 Through its definition of
"take," the statute prohibits, inter alia, harassing, harming, or
attempting to harass or harm any endangered animal. 4 1  An
individual may not "harass" an endangered creature by "annoying" the
animal "to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal
behavioral patterns," including "breeding, feeding, or sheltering."42
Additionally, a person may not "harm" an endangered animal by
killing or injuring it-either directly or indirectly-such as by
"significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering."43 However, an individual may use
"generally accepted" breeding procedures or provide veterinary care to
a captive animal as long as minimum standards required by AWA are
satisfied and such actions are not likely to injure the animal. 44
Additionally, the Secretary of the Interior may issue permits
authorizing certain takings that "enhance the propagation or survival
of the affected species."45
ESA's citizen-suit provision enables private parties to play an
active role in the enforcement of the statute.46 Under the provision,
"any person" may file a civil suit to enjoin "any person" alleged to be in
violation of the Act or its regulations and may sue to compel the
Secretary of the Interior to apply certain prohibitions regarding the
35. Id. at 102.
36. Id. at 104.
37. Id. at 103.
38. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2010).
39. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants-Definitions, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3
(2010).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A).
41. Id. § 1532(19).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(A).
46. Patricia M. Wald, The Role of the Judiciary in Environmental Protection, 19 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 519, 525 (1992).
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"taking" of endangered or threatened species. 47 Congress authorized
ESA suits by "private attorneys general" 4 8 because legislators are
aware that federal regulators and the entities they oversee "may work
out 'agreements' that are not necessarily true to the spirit of the
environmental law in question."49 Congress intended that citizen
suits would encourage enforcement in such cases.50
Nevertheless, an ESA enforcement gap similar to that of AWA
reduces the protection available for captive endangered animals.
Although the Department of the Interior, through the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), must notify the public and accept comments
before issuing permits for takings designed to "enhance the
propagation or survival" of an endangered species, 51 private citizens
have no recourse to ensure the provisions of those permits are actually
followed. 52  Because the ESA citizen-suit provision has been
interpreted not to encompass private enforcement of permits, the
conditions of captive-bred wildlife permits may go unenforced. 53
C. Standing
Regardless of which statute a plaintiff invokes, a person
seeking to employ the judicial process to protect animals routinely
runs into the barrier of lacking standing.54 To bring a claim in federal
court, a plaintiff must satisfy the standing requirements derived from
Article III of the Constitution55 as well as judicially-created prudential
limitations on standing.56 In order to establish that a set of facts
presents a "case or controversy" under Article III, a plaintiff must
show
47. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2010).
48. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997).
49. Wald, supra note 46, at 525.
50. Plaintiffs' Memorandum Regarding Relevant Statutory Authority and Regulatory
Authority at 3, ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009), available at
http://www.bornfreeusa.org/ala6a-courtdocuments.php (quoting Wald, supra note 46, at 525).
51. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(c)-(d) (2010); Prohibitions, 50 C.F.R. §
17.21(g)(ii) (2010); Permits for scientific purposes, enhancement of propagation or survival, or for
incidental taking, 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(a)(1) (2010).
52. ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 502 F. Supp. 2d 103, 111-12
(D.D.C. 2007).
53. Id.
54. See Michael J. Ritter, Standing in the Way of Animal Welfare: A Reconsideration of
the Zone-of-Interest "Gloss" on the Administrative Procedures Act, 29 REV. LITIG. 951, 972-79
(2010) (examining the standing challenges plaintiffs faces in various ESA and AWA cases).
55. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
56. Performing Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, No.
1:00CV01641, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12203, at *1 (D.D.C. Jun. 29, 2001), rev'd sub nom. ASPCA
v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 335-37 (D.C. Cir. 2003), judgment for
defendants sub nom. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55.
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that (1) he has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant; and, (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
5 7
Additionally, prudential limitations on standing prevent a
plaintiff from asserting a grievance held by the public generally58 or a
claim belonging to a third party.59 A plaintiff asserting her own
particularized injury must also demonstrate that the injury is
"arguably within the zone of interest" to be protected by the statute at
issue.60
Plaintiffs seeking to redress harm to animals often fail to
demonstrate particularized injury, since the animals rather than the
human plaintiffs suffer the physical harm. However, a plaintiff may
satisfy constitutional standing requirements by alleging injuries that
"reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as
economic values."61 Furthermore, Congress may create a statutory
right-such as the right to information-that gives rise to a cognizable
injury.62 Finally, when Congress specifies that "any person" may sue
under a given statute, a plaintiff suing under that statute
automatically satisfies the prudential zone of interest requirement. 63
D. Statutory Violations at the Circus
Elephant abuse has been documented at Ringling on numerous
occasions. 64  Customary methods of training and housing circus
elephants include striking elephants with a sharp implement (the bull
hook) to train and discipline them,65 confining elephants for hours on
short chains during transit and while housed in barns between
57. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64-65 (restating the standing requirements set
forth in Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61).
58. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974).
59. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).
60. Cass R. Sunstein, A Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst: Standing for Animals (with Notes
on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA. L. REV. 1333, 1343 (2000) [hereinafter Standing for Animals].
61. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)).
62. FEC v Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-5 (1998); Standing for Animals, supra note 60, at
1343.
63. ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 336 (D.C. Cir.
2003), judgment for defendants sub nom. ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64
(D.D.C. 2009) (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163-65 (1997)).
64. See generally ASPCA Report, supra note 4.
65. See Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 13,
Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 03-2006), available at http://www.bornfreeusa.org/
ala6a courtdocuments.php [hereinafter Findings of Fact] (citing deposition testimony describing
the bull hook and its use).
162 [Vol. 13:1:155
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performances, 66 and forcibly removing infant calves from their
mothers unnaturally early to begin training them to perform in the
circus.67 These practices violate both AWA and ESA.68
The most graphic accounts of abuse involve the bull hook, a
two- to three-foot-long metal or fiberglass rod with a steel hook and
point at one end that trainers use to control circus elephants. 69
Kenneth Feld, Chief Executive Officer of Feld Entertainment, has
stated, "it can be very appropriate to 'correct' an elephant with a bull
hook," and has acknowledged that Ringling employees often "strike" or
"prod" elephants with the hooked end of the implement in order to
coerce them to perform. 70 Striving to control elephants that weigh up
to twelve thousand pounds,71 trainers often seriously injure the
animals. 72 For example, one former Ringling employee admitted
beating an elephant with a bull hook for fifteen minutes after the
animal knocked him to the ground. 73 The effects of bull hook abuse
have also been documented in internal Ringling memoranda74 and in
USDA investigative documents.75
Another form of abuse consists of chaining elephants on hard
surfaces for extended periods of time. One Ringling employee's sworn
66. See id. at 21 (reporting deposition testimony of Gary Jacobson, general manager of
Ringling's Center for Elephant Conservation, regarding the amount of time elephants spend in
chains at the center).
67. See David Montgomery, PETA, Ringling Bros. at Odds Over the Treatment of Baby
Circus Elephants, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contentlarticle/2009/12/15/AR2009121504988.html (reporting former Ringling employee
Sammy Haddock's description of eighteen to twenty month-old elephants being torn from their
mothers, while the mothers are chained to a wall, and quoting baby animal specialist Phyllis
Lee's statement that baby elephants in the wild stay with their mothers until age five or six).
68. See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Feld Entm't, Inc., 677
F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 03-2006), available at http://www.bornfreeusa.org/ala6a-courtdocuments.
php.
69. See Findings of Fact, supra note 65, at 13 (citing deposition testimony describing the
bull hook and its use).
70. Designated Deposition Transcript of Kenneth Feld at 97, Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F.
Supp. 2d 55 (No. 03-2006), available at http://www.bornfreeusa.org/ala6a-highlight~h.php.
71. See Fascinating Facts, RINGLING BROS. AND BARNUM & BAILEY, http://www.ringling.
com/TextContent.aspx?id=12336&parentlD=320&assetFolderlD=448 (last visited Sept. 10, 2010)
(stating that an average male Asian elephant weighs between 10,000 and 12,000 pounds).
72. See, e.g., Findings of Fact, supra note 65, at 24-25 (quoting Ringling internal
documents regarding bull hook "puncture wounds" and an elephant "dripping blood all over the
arena" after being hooked).
73. Montgomery, supra note 67 (quoting Sammy Haddock's declaration). The same
former employee described a 1977 incident where an elephant knocked him unconscious, and
upon regaining consciousness, the employee grabbed an electric prod and "fried [the elephant] for
about ten minutes," after which the elephant "was screaming and regurgitating water." Id. See
also ASPCA Report, supra note 4, at 29.
74. E.g., Findings of Fact, supra note 65, at 24-25.
75. E.g., ASPCA Report, supra note 4, at 29, 35, 111.
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affidavit to a USDA investigator states that, "as a general rule, the
elephants [are] kept chained at all times, except when performing." 76
As a matter of "common practice" elephants remain chained for twenty
to one hundred hours at a time when they travel between shows.77
Moreover, according to the manager of Ringling's breeding facility, the
"Center for Elephant Conservation," elephants spend a minimum of
sixteen hours per day chained on concrete surfaces while at the
center.78  Standing on hard surfaces for long periods causes the
elephants extensive foot, leg, and joint injuries.79 Confining elephants
to chains so short they cannot "take a full step forward or backward"80
significantly impairs their "essential and normal behavioral
patterns."81
Finally, elephant calves as young as eighteen months old are
forcibly separated from their mothers long before the age of five or six,
when calves would be weaned in the wild. 8 2 The separation, achieved
by chaining the mother to a wall while six or seven staff members pull
the baby away with ropes, 83 often physically injures the elephantS84
and stresses both mother and calf.85 Although Ringling claims to have
stopped using the abrupt separation process in the late 1990s, an
employee who worked with Ringling's elephants until 2005 has
suggested otherwise. 86
76. E.g., id. at 59.
77. Plaintiffs' Amended Pre-Trial Statement at 6, ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F.
Supp. 2d 55, 64 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 03-2006), available at http://www.bornfreeusa.org/
ala6a courtdocuments.php.
78. Findings of Fact, supra note 65, at 19.
79. E.g. Nicole Paquette, Undeniable Evidence: Federal Trial Exposes Evidence of
Ringling's Mistreatment of Elephants, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA'S ADVOCACY FOR ANIMALS
(Aug. 17, 2009), http://advocacy.britannica.com/blog/advocacy/2009/08/undeniable-evidence-
federal-trial-exposes-ringlings-mistreatment-of-elephants/ [hereinafter Undeniable Evidence].
80. Findings of Fact, supra note 65, at 19.
81. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Pre-Trial Statement, supra note 77, at 7.
82. See Montgomery, supra note 67.
83. Id.
84. ASPCA Report, supra note 4, at 71.
85. Id. at 72 (stating the opinion of experts, who "[d]on't recommend separation until at
least 2 years," and commenting that the approach used by Ringling is "traumatic, stressful,
cause[s] physical harm and unnecessary discomfort").
86. Montgomery, supra note 67.
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II. STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT GAPS AND THE SUCCESSES AND
FAILURES OF THE RINGLING LITIGATION
A. Enforcement Gaps in the Animal Welfare Act
Although AWA exists "to insure that animals intended for use
in ... exhibition ... are provided humane care and treatment,"87 the
Act has failed to protect circus elephants from abuse primarily for two
reasons: (1) the statute lacks a citizen-suit provision, and (2) it grants
the Secretary of Agriculture broad enforcement discretion. Without a
citizen-suit provision, ASPCA could not sue Ringling for its AWA
violations;88 and yet, with broad discretion granted to the Secretary,
when the USDA neglected to enforce the Act against Ringling, ASPCA
could not sue the agency to compel enforcement.89
ASPCA could not sue Ringling for its AWA violations because,
although animal advocates have argued in favor of amending AWA to
include a citizen-suit provision 90 and bills have been introduced in
Congress advocating the same,91 these efforts have been unsuccessful
and courts have refused to imply a private cause of action.92 The
Fourth Circuit's opinion in the Silver Spring Monkey Case
demonstrates why animal advocates have failed to procure an AWA
citizen-suit provision. The court expressed concern that a private
cause of action would draw courts lacking expertise in the biomedical
field into the "supervision and regulation of laboratory research"93 and
that a flood of private litigation under the Act "would impede advances
made by medical science in the alleviation of human suffering."94
Finally, it reasoned that the statutory scheme through which
Congress had given the USDA broad enforcement discretion left no
place for AWA suits by private plaintiffs.95
ASPCA also could not sue the USDA to compel enforcement
against Ringling because agency decisions not to bring enforcement
87. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2010).
88. Int'l Primate Protection League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934,
940 (4th Cir. 1986).
89. See 7 U.S.C § 2149 (permitting, but not requiring, the Secretary to suspend licenses
or assess civil penalties); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985).
90. Symposium, Confronting Barriers to the Courtroom for Animal Advocates: Legal
Standing for Animals and Advocates, 13 ANIMAL L. 61 (2006) [hereinafter Confronting Barriers].
91. Rob Roy Smith, Note, Standing on Their Own Four Legs: The Future of Animal
Welfare Litigation After Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 29 ENVTL. L. 989, 1026-
27 (1999).
92. Int'l Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 940.
93. Id. at 935, 940.
94. Id. at 935.
95. Id. at 940.
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action are presumptively unreviewable by courts.96 The presumption
may be rebutted when (1) a statute provides guidelines for the agency
to follow in exercising its enforcement discretion, and (2) the agency
"consciously and expressly adopt[s] a general policy" that amounts to
abdication of its statutory responsibilities. 97  However, animal
advocates have been unable to rebut the presumption in the AWA
context, because the statute seems to require so little of the
Secretary.98
For instance, in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman,
animal welfare advocates attempted, but failed, to compel USDA
enforcement of AWA for the benefit of primates. 99 The Animal Legal
Defense Fund (ALDF) claimed that the USDA abdicated its AWA
enforcement responsibilities by failing to inspect research facilities
and document AWA violations.100 However, because the plaintiffs
admitted that the agency "does engage in some enforcement actions"
and the court determined the statute did not mandate any specific
enforcement action, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim. 101 While
acknowledging the inconsistency of Congress' broad grant of discretion
with the Act's clear purpose to ensure humane treatment of
animals, 102 the court determined that the Act's discretionary language
provided the USDA "a free hand and a shield" against judicial review
of its enforcement decisions. 103
Animal welfare advocates have also been unable to compel
USDA enforcement of AWA to protect circus elephants. 104  The
organization that later initiated the Ringling litigation, the
Performing Animal Welfare Society (PAWS), sought a writ of
mandamus in 1996 to compel the USDA "to exercise its discretion"
and enforce AWA to protect "performing elephants from neglect and
mistreatment."105 PAWS alleged that a number of elephant exhibitors
were in "flagrant violation" of AWA, and that the USDA failed to take
96. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985).
97. Id. at 832-33 n.4.
98. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 943 F. Supp. 44, 63 (D.D.C. 1996), rev'd,
204 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 62.
101. Id. at 63-64 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 50 ("[W]hile Congress set forth a clear mandate of humane treatment of
animals, it then took away from that mandate by granting unbridled discretion to the agency
which, as past experience indicates, will do little or nothing.").
103. Id. at 63-64.
104. Performing Animal Welfare Soc'y v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. Animal & Plant Health
Inspection Serv., No. 95-4719, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13306, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1996).
105. Id. at *1.
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action against the exhibitors after investigating violations.106
However, because the Mandamus ActI0 7 provides courts authority only
to compel ministerial acts owed to a plaintiff or to remedy federal
officials' clear abuse of discretion,108 the court dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. It held that the action PAWS sought to compel
was not ministerial, and that the Secretary had not abused the broad
discretion granted by AWA.109 Furthermore, the court concluded that
the plaintiff lacked standing, observing that, while "[i]t may be
unfortunate that a person or group with a special interest in animal
welfare does not have standing to take legal action in cases of
inhumane treatment ... Congress has seen fit to rely on the
Secretary's discretion in such matters."110
B. Using the Endangered Species Act to Protect Circus Elephants: A
Novel Approach
Given the limited utility of AWA, the endangered status of
Asian elephants, and the existence of the ESA citizen-suit provision,
animal groups turned to ESA to protect circus elephants.' In an
early attempt to invoke ESA protections for an elephant, the Humane
Society of the United States (HSUS) challenged the validity of a
certificate issued by Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt allowing a
corporation to transport an elephant from a zoo in one state to a circus
in another. 112 Because ESA prohibits the interstate transportation of
endangered animals in the course of a commercial activity, HSUS
alleged the certificate was invalid.11 3 The district court granted
Babbitt summary judgment on the merits, but the District of
Columbia Circuit Court vacated the decision and ordered the case
dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked standing.114
Although the plaintiffs in Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Babbitt
failed to establish standing, the appellate court's opinion signaled a
106. Id. at *2.
107. 28 U.S.C. 1361.
108. Performing Animal Welfare Soc'y, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13306, at *3-4.
109. Id. at *4-5.
110. Id. at *6-7. The court reasoned that the plaintiff had not suffered a cognizable injury
because, although its members were "appalled" by the treatment of elephants, and PAWS had
expended resources to rescue mistreated elephants, "an offense to one's sensibilities" was not an
injury-in-fact, and voluntary expenditures did not constitute grounds for economic injury. Id. at
*5-6.
111. See Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Ringling
Brothers was also named a defendant. Id.
112. Id. at 95.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 96.
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judicial willingness to expand the scope of aesthetic injury to recognize
emotional harm as a basis for constitutional standing.115 The court
rejected claims that members of HSUS were emotionally injured by
the removal of Lota the elephant from the zoo, explaining that the
Society's members had not alleged specific facts in support of their
injuries. 116 However, the opinion stated
To be sure, no court has yet considered whether an emotional attachment to a particular
animal (not owned by a plaintiff) based upon the animal being housed in a particular
location could form the predicate of a claim of injury. . .. Although we are doubtful that
it has been established here, a person who had made a particular study of Lota the
elephant over a period of time might be able to claim injury from her sudden departure
from the zoo.
1 17
Animal welfare advocates were encouraged by the court's
willingness to consider an injury based on an emotional attachment to
a particular animal and believed the opinion might predict future
success by an appropriate plaintiff.118
C. The Ringling Litigation
Shortly after the circuit court decided Babbitt, animal welfare
groups found a plaintiff who could allege an injury based on his
emotional attachment to a group of circus elephants. 119 In 2000,
animal welfare organizations including the Performing Animal
Welfare Society (PAWS) 120 and ASPCA recruited former Ringling
"barn man" Tom Rider to file a complaintl 21 in federal court seeking to
invoke the protections of ESA for Ringling's fifty-four Asian
elephants. 12 2  Presenting the plaintiffs strongest argument for
115. Id. at 97-98.
116. Id. at 98-99.
117. Id.
118. David Schram, Standing Under the Endangered Species Act, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1244, 1252 (1996).
119. See Performing Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus,
No. 1:00CV01641, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12203 (Jun. 29, 2001), rev'd sub nom. ASPCA v.
Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003), judgment for
defendants sub nom. ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009).
120. PAWS left the case pursuant to a settlement agreement with Feld in late 2000,
through which the organization gained possession of two of Ringling's elephants, Minnie and
Rebecca. ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 74 (D.D.C. 2009); Performing Animal
Welfare Society (PAWS), Meet the Elephants, PAWSWEB.ORG, available at http://www.
pawsweb.org/meet elephants.html.
121. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 69.
122. Performing Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, No.
1:00CV01641, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12203 (D.D.C. Jun. 29, 2001), rev'd sub nom. ASPCA v.
Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003), judgment for
defendants sub nom. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55. See Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d
55, 58-59 (discussing the history of the case).
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standing,123 Rider alleged that he suffered aesthetic injury during the
nearly two years he worked for Ringling, when he witnessed Ringling
employees abuse elephants to which he felt a strong emotional
connection. 124 He claimed ongoing injuries because, having quit his
job with the circus to stop witnessing abuse, he could not visit or work
with the animals again, without suffering additional injury, until the
mistreatment ended. 125 The district court disagreed: Because Rider
had left his job with Ringling two years before filing suit and did not
continue to witness the alleged mistreatment during the suit's
pendency, the court determined that Rider failed to allege an aesthetic
injury that was presently or imminently suffered. 126 Additionally,
while Rider asserted that he wished to work with the elephants again,
the court deemed this claim too "speculative and uncertain" to
constitute an imminently threatened injury-in-fact. 127
The court similarly rebuffed the standing arguments urged by
the organizational plaintiffs, who alleged informational and aesthetic
injuries.128 The groups argued that Ringling's failure to apply for a
permit each time it abused its elephants-thus "taking" endangered
animals without permissionl 29-deprived the organizations of
information they were entitled to receive under the ESA public notice
and comment procedures.130 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged an
aesthetic injury "due to the harm defendants ha[d] inflicted upon the
elephants,"131 and the plaintiffs claimed they continued to suffer as a
result of their knowledge that Ringling continued to abuse its
elephants.13 2  According to the court, however, the alleged
informational injury could only be brought against the agency that
failed to follow notice and comment procedures; it could not be
pursued against a party that failed to apply for a permit.133
Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they
suffered an aesthetic injury because "general emotional 'harm,' no
matter how deeply felt cannot suffice for injury-in-fact for standing
123. ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 336 (D.C. Cir.
2003), judgment for defendants sub nom. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59-60.
124. Performing Animal Welfare Soc'y, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12203, at *4.
125. Id. For additional analysis of the parties' standing arguments, see Mark Eichelman,
Ringling Brothers on Trial: Circus Elephants and the Endangered Species Act, 16 ANIMAL L. 153,
160-62 (2009).
126. Id. at *7.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *11-13.
129. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1), 1539 (2010).
130. Performing Animal Welfare Soc'y, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12203, Id. at *13.
131. Id. at *3.
132. Id. at *4.
133. Id. at *14-15.
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purposes." 134 After rejecting each argument for standing, the district
court dismissed the case.135
In a significant victory for the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's
decision in 2003, holding that Rider had alleged facts sufficient to
support standing.136  The court determined that "emotional
attachment to a particular animal . . . could form the predicate of a
claim of injury,"137 and that Rider had alleged a "strong, personal
attachment" to the elephants with which he worked at Ringling.138
Likening Rider's injury to that alleged by the plaintiffs in Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (Laidlaw), the court
determined that Rider's injury was sufficiently imminent to satisfy
constitutional standing requirements. 13 9  Although the Laidlaw
plaintiffs who stopped using a polluted river for recreational purposes
did not establish when they would return to the river if the pollution
stopped, the Supreme Court deemed their injury sufficiently
imminent. 140 Likewise, although Rider was unlikely to work with the
elephants again, the court reasoned that he could view them at any
time by purchasing a ticket to the circus.141 Because Rider had
experience working with the elephants, the court reasoned that during
a visit to the circus Rider would be able to detect behavioral
manifestations of any ongoing abuse, which would cause him
continued aesthetic injuries. 142
Although the appellate court's standing decision enabled the
plaintiffs to proceed to trial, Ringling succeeded in reducing the
number of elephants and forms of abuse that would be affected by the
outcome of the case through pre-trial motions. 143 In 2007, the district
134. Id. at *10 (quoting Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir.
1998)).
135. Performing Animal Welfare Soc'y, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12203, at *4.
136. ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 336 (D.C. Cir.
2003), judgment for defendants sub nom. ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C.
2009).
137. Ringling Bros., 317 F.3d at 337 (citing Babbitt, 46 F.3d at 98).
138. Id. at 335.
139. Id. at 337-38.
140. Id. at 337 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167,
184 (2000)).
141. Id.
142. Id. The court held with minimal discussion that the other elements of standing were
satisfied: Rider's alleged injury was caused by Ringling's actions and would be redressed by a
favorable decision. Id. at 338. The court did not address whether the other plaintiffs had
standing because they sought relief identical to that sought by Rider. Id. Prudential standing
was not an issue because the ESA enables "any person" to sue under the statute. Id. at 336.
143. See, e.g., ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 502 F. Supp. 2d 103,
105, 111-14 (D.D.C. 2007).
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court granted Ringling summary judgment with respect to the twenty-
one elephants for which Ringling possessed valid, captive-bred wildlife
permits.14 4 The court held that treatment of elephants kept subject to
captive-bred wildlife permits could not be addressed in private
litigation because the Act reserved permit enforcement actions for the
Secretary of the Interior.145 Because Ringling's youngest elephants-
all held under captive-bred wildlife permits-were no longer at issue
in the case, the plaintiffs' claims regarding forceful separation of
elephant calves from their mothers could not be addressed at trial. 14 6
Through additional motions, Ringling eventually reduced the number
of elephants at issue in the case to only seven.14 7
The trial began in February 2009, nearly a decade after the
complaint was filed. 14 8 Approximately thirty witnesses testified and
hundreds of documents were admitted into evidence over the course of
a six-week, non-jury trial.149 However, the court declined to reach the
merits of the case. 50 Because the court considered Rider "essentially
a paid plaintiff and fact witness who [was] not credible," 15 1 the court
entered judgment for the defendants, finding that Rider failed to prove
the facts in support of standing that the appellate court had accepted
as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss.15 2 The court found that
the organizational plaintiffs, and the law firm representing them, paid
Rider to participate in the case, thus undermining his credibility.153
According to the court, Rider began receiving compensation from
PAWS when he gave a sworn statement about Ringling's elephant
abuse in 2000, and over the course of the Ringling litigation, Rider
received funds totaling $185,000 from other participants in the case. 154
Although the payments may have been for Rider's participation in the
"public education campaign" that was intertwined with the Ringling
litigation, the court believed the primary purpose of the payments was
to keep Rider involved in the case.155
144. Id. at 105. The court denied Ringling's motion for summary judgment with regard to
thirty-four of Ringling's elephants, whose captivity predated their classification as an
endangered species. Ringling had argued that this distinction exempted them from the ESA's
"takings" provision. Id. at 107-10.
145. Id. at 113.
146. ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009).
147. Id. at 58 n.2.
148. Id. at 57.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 66.
151. Id. at 67.
152. Id. at 66.
153. Id. at 72-73.
154. Id. at 73, 78-79.
155. Id. at 80- i.
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Furthermore, evidence at trial discredited Rider's claim that he
suffered aesthetic injuries due to Ringling's abuse of elephants with
which he had a strong personal attachment.156 Because Rider never
complained to Feld executives, veterinarians, or USDA inspectors
prior to the Ringling litigation, 157 the court concluded that Rider either
did not witness mistreatment, or that "any mistreatment he did
witness did not affect him to the extent that he suffered an aesthetic
or emotional injury."158 Similarly, Rider's failure to visit the elephants
outside the circus, despite numerous opportunities to do so during the
course of the Ringling litigation, undermined his claim of strong
personal attachment to the elephants.159
Finally, even if Rider had suffered an injury, the court
determined it could not redress the injury, because enjoining the
defendants from using bull hooks and chains could not guarantee the
outcome Rider desired-to see the elephants again, free from abuse. 160
During the decade of litigation, Ringling had retired five elephants at
issue in the case to its private facility, and trial testimony revealed
that Rider would never gain access to that property. 161 Moreover, Feld
executives testified that if they could not use bull hooks and chains on
the other elephants at issue in the case, those elephants would also be
retired from the circus. 162 Because the court, therefore, could not
guarantee that Rider would see the elephants again, free from abuse,
the judge determined he could not redress Rider's alleged injury.163
D. Successes and Failures of the Ringling Litigation
Although ASPCA ultimately lost its case against Ringling,164
animal activists may consider the Ringling litigation a success in
many respects. The circuit court's expansion of the category of
"aesthetic injury," for example, may provide animal advocates greater
access to the courtroom in the future.165 Additionally, by surviving
Ringling's motion to dismiss, ASPCA gained a five-year pre-trial
156. Id. at 88-91.
157. Id. at 68-69.
158. Id. at 69.
159. Id. at 84.
160. Id. at 87-88, 91-94.
161. Id. at 87, 92. At this stage of the litigation, the plaintiffs no longer sought forfeiture
of the elephants. Id. at 91.
162. Id. at 87.
163. Id. at 91-92.
164. Id. at 67.
165. Developments in the Law-Access to Courts, Aesthetic Injuries, Animal Rights, and
Anthropomorphism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1204, 1210 (2009) [hereinafter Access to Courts].
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discovery period, 166 during which it obtained significant information
about elephant abuse at the circus.167 Furthermore, the case served to
educate the public about the outrageous treatment of endangered
elephants and about the failures of the statutes intended to protect
them. 168 As former Chief Judge Wald has opined, "[1]itigation serves
to point out the ambiguities and counterproductive provisions in a
particular law, [as well as] the gaps and loopholes in its regulatory
scheme."169
On the other hand, the Ringling litigation consumed a
significant amount of attorneys' and judges' time170 and animal
advocates' money, 171 while the legal objective of the suit-protecting
elephants from abuse-remains largely unaccomplished. 172
Furthermore, as the opinion concluding the ten-year litigation
demonstrates, the theory of standing developed in the case may be of
limited future utility because it requires the plaintiff to witness the
effects of animal abuse, which the abuser will often hide. 173
Additionally, less costly means might have achieved the educational
benefits gleaned from the litigation. 174
1. Standing
"For animal advocates, one of the most significant barriers to
the courtroom is standing."175 Thus, the appellate court's holding that
''an emotional attachment to a particular animal could form the
predicate of a claim of injury"176 has enabled a promising paradigm for
those striving to use the legal system to protect animals. In so
holding, the court enlarged the scope of injury that could be recognized
as an "aesthetic injury," which should ease the burden on future
166. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d at 59 n.5.
167. Undeniable Evidence, supra note 79.
168. Id.
169. Wald, supra note 46, at 520.
170. E.g., Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d at 59 n.5 ("Significant judicial resources were
expended, particularly during the more than five years of discovery in this matter, in order to
advance this litigation to trial.").
171. E.g., id. at 78-79 (concluding that, over a ten-year period, the organizational
plaintiffs paid Tom Rider at least $190,000 for the primary purpose "to keep Mr. Rider involved
with the litigation").
172. Id. at 89-90.
173. Id. at 92-93.
174. For example, by distributing information obtained from the USDA under the
Freedom of Information Act. See, e.g., ASPCA Report, supra note 4.
175. Confronting Barriers, supra note 90, at 61.
176. ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 337 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (quoting Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
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plaintiffs suing for the protection of animals. 177 Citing Laidlaw, the
appellate court reasoned that a plaintiff with an attachment to a
particular animal could suffer an aesthetic injury as a result of abuse
to that animal, in the same way that a plaintiff who enjoys using a
particular river suffers from pollution to that river.178 The court
stated: "A person may derive great pleasure from visiting a certain
river; the pleasure may be described as an emotional attachment
stemming from the river's pristine beauty."179 Just as the Laidlaw
plaintiffs suffered a cognizable injury, so too could a plaintiff with an
emotional attachment to an animal. 180
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on this novel theory
of standing, the emotional injury appears to pass constitutional
muster.181  A plaintiff will likely satisfy constitutional standing
requirements if the defendant's harm to a particular animal
demonstrably caused the plaintiffs emotional injury.18 2 In any event,
until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, a plaintiff suing in the
District of Columbia Circuit will survive a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing by alleging an emotional injury,183 thus enabling animal
advocates to gain valuable information about the treatment of animals
through discovery. 184
The expansion of aesthetic injury to encompass the emotional
injuries of individuals who share an attachment with particular
animals also may presage a judicial move toward recognizing that
individual animals have rights.185 Although Congress enacted ESA to
conserve entire species, 186 the appellate court in the Ringling litigation
recognized that individual members of those species have certain
rights-at least the right to be free from abuse that emotionally
injures a human.187 Although the distinction may seem insignificant,
the court's recognition that individual animals have any rights at all
foreshadows that animals may enjoy greater access to judicial
protections in the future.s88
177. Access to Courts, supra note 165, at 1210.
178. Ringling Bros., 317 F.3d at 338.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Jonathan Krieger, Emotions and Standing for Animal Advocates After ASPCA v.
Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 22 LAW & INEQ. 385, 400 (2004).
182. Id.
183. Ringling Bros., 317 F.3d at 338.
184. Undeniable Evidence, supra note 79.
185. Access to Courts, supra note 165, at 1211.
186. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2010) (declaration of purposes and
policy).
187. Access to Courts, supra note 165, at 1212.
188. Id. at 1216.
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Despite its potential benefits, however, the emotional injury
theory may fall short in practice. For instance, in the circus context,
the only plaintiff likely to prove an emotional injury is someone who
has worked with a particular animal.89 Such a plaintiff would likely
jeopardize a career as a trainer or handler to come forward and
implicate an employer in abusive conduct.190 Furthermore, because
plaintiffs cannot establish standing by alleging a past injury, the
employee would have to witness the mistreatment on an ongoing
basis. 191 Finally, even in the rare case in which a plaintiff could
establish standing, any remedy the court offered would only protect
the few animals to which the plaintiff could prove an emotional
attachment. 192
The district court's opinion regarding Tom Rider's lack of
standing in the Ringling litigation illustrates problems with this
theory.193  Because the organizational plaintiffs did not have an
emotional attachment to Ringling's elephants, and the district court
rejected their informational injury claim, they had to rely upon Rider's
alleged emotional injury to gain standing to bring the case. 194
However, because Rider accepted large amounts of money from the
organizational plaintiffs and never complained about the
mistreatment of Ringling's elephants prior to his involvement in the
litigation,195 he could not to prove that Ringling's alleged elephant
abuse caused him emotional injury.196 Furthermore, because an
injunction against abuse can only remedy an emotional injury if the
plaintiff is able to "enjoy the fauna again after cessation of the
challenged actions," Rider's alleged injury was not redressable,
because Ringling would not allow Rider to see its elephants again.197
Given the difficulties associated with finding a plaintiff who
can prove an emotional injury and establishing that the injury can be
redressed by the court, the organizational plaintiffs' informational
injury theory may offer more promise for future animal protection
189. See Hagan v. Feld Entm't Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Va. 2005) for a case
involving a circus employee fired from his job as a Ringling lion handler after he told USDA
inspectors about AWA violations that resulted in the death of a circus lion.
190. Id.
191. ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 91 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Access to
Courts, supra note 165, at 1213.
192. Feld Entm't, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (limiting plaintiffs' standing to those elephants
with which Rider worked and to which any remedy would apply).
193. Id. at 96.
194. Id. at 96-97.
195. Id. at 89, 94.
196. Id. at 94.
197. Id. at 91-92. The court also found no basis in ESA to compel Feld to allow Rider
access to that facility. Id. at 92.
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cases than the emotional injury theory. Had ASPCA succeeded in
demonstrating an informational injury, the organization would not
have had to rely upon Rider, and whatever relief the organization
could obtain would apply to all of Ringling's elephants rather than the
few with which Rider allegedly shared an emotional connection.
Unfortunately, the informational injury theory failed in this case
because Congress did not create a statutory right to information under
ESA. 198 Although the Act provides for public notice and comment
procedures when a person applies for a permit to "take" an
endangered animal, ASPCA would have been entitled to the
procedures only if Ringling had applied for permits to take its
elephants. 199  Because Fish and Wildlife Service did not require
Ringling to apply for permits, ASPCA's alleged injury resulted from
inaction by FWS-a nonparty. 200
2. Information and Education
Although each theory of standing ultimately failed at trial,
surviving Ringling's motion to dismiss enabled ASPCA to gather
valuable information through discovery and trial, which the group
used in a public education campaign. 201 Over the course of a five-year
discovery period and a six-week trial, the plaintiffs obtained
information about Ringling's abuse and its impact on the elephants'
health directly from Feld executives and company documents. 202 As
information spread through websites and news media, the litigation
presumably turned public opinion against the circus and its practice of
using wild animals in exhibition. 203 In time, Ringling may face
economic pressure if the public stops attending circuses that abuse
animals, and legislators may face political pressure to amend laws
that have been largely ineffective at preventing abuse. 204
The information that the plaintiffs procured through discovery
and the manner in which it came out-through video footage and
198. Id. at 99.
199. Id. at 98.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 80; see also Undeniable Evidence, supra note 79.
202. Undeniable Evidence, supra note 79.
203. See, e.g., Ringling Trial News Stories, BORN FREE USA, http://www.bornfreeusa.
org/ala6g press.php (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (listing newspaper articles covering the
Ringling trial).
204. See, e.g., Benjamin Adams & Jean Larson, Legislative History of the Animal Welfare
Act-Introduction, NAT'L AGRIC. LIBRARY, http://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/pubs/AWA2007/
intro.shtml (last modified Feb. 17, 2010) (explaining that articles in Life and Sports Illustrated
about the use of dogs in laboratory research "stimulated such a public outcry that Congress
eventually wrote and passed the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act in 1966").
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testimony by executives and expert witnesses-likely affected the
public psyche in a way that simply distributing USDA investigative
reports could not.2 05  Although ASPCA had already uncovered
evidence of abuse in USDA investigative reports, the hours of video
footage entered into evidence at trial, which showed Ringling's
elephants in chains and being hit with bull hooks confirmed the
suffering in a visceral way. 2 0 6 Testimony from Feld executives and
Ringling employees established that abuse occurred not only in
isolated incidents investigated by the USDA, but as a matter of
course. For instance, Kenneth Feld admitted in a sworn deposition
that Ringling employees "strike" elephantS207 and "prod" them with
the hooked end of the bull hook,208 and the manager of Ringling's
''conservation center" testified that elephants there-including those
retired from the circus-spent an average of twelve hours a day in
chains.209 Finally, the medical records of Ringling's elephants showed
that all thirty-eight of its adult elephants and fourteen of its sixteen
baby elephants suffered from foot-related problems, which an expert
witness testified resulted from the elephants spending the majority of
their lives chained on hard surfaces. 210
Because advocates of animal welfare and animal rights
publicized this information on their websiteS211 and major newspapers
covered the legal battle,212 the litigation had an educational impact
likely to affect both circus attendance and lawmaking. Given that
educational efforts of a more limited scope have successfully decreased
circus attendance in the past,2 13 the Ringling litigation may also spur
a national decline in circus attendance. Alternatively, circus patrons
now cognizant of animal abuse may satisfy their desire for
205. ASPCA Report, supra note 4.
206. Id.
207. Designated Deposition Transcript of Kenneth Feld at 97, ASPCA v. Feld Entm't,
Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 03-2006), available at http://www.
bornfreeusa.org/ala6a highlight h.php.
208. Id. at 98.
209. Designated Deposition Transcript of Gary Jacobson at 154, Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F.
Supp. 2d 55 (No. 03-2006), available at http://www.bornfreeusa.org/ala6a8_exhibits.php.
210. Undeniable Evidence, supra note 79.
211. E.g., Press Release, ASPCA, Animal Protection Groups Ask Federal Court to Halt
Ringling Bros.' Cruel Chaining and Confinement of Endangered Asian Elephants (May 21, 2008)
available at http://www.awionline.org/ht/displayReleaseDetails/i/1782/pid/232; Ringling Trial
Court Documents and Exhibits, BORN FREE USA, http://www.bornfreeusa.org/ala6a
courtdocuments.php (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
212. See, e.g., Ringling Trial News Stories, BORN FREE USA, http://www.bornfreeusa.
org/ala6g-press.php (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (listing newspaper articles covering the
Ringling trial).
213. Rachel L. Einwohner, Practices, Opportunity, and Protest Effectiveness: Illustrations
from Four Animal Rights Campaigns, 46:2 Soc. PROBS. 169, 177 (1999).
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entertainment with spectacles such as Cirque du Soleil or circuses
that employ lasers and electronics instead of exotic animals. 214 The
increased public awareness raised by the litigation may also translate
into legislative action. For example, Congress enacted AWA largely in
response to magazine articles exposing the treatment of laboratory
dogs,215 and 1985 amendments to protect primate well-being followed
the highly publicized Silver Spring Monkey Case.216 Several countries
and municipalities have even banned the use of wild animals in
circuses in response to public reaction to animal abuse. 217
3. Halting Elephant Abuse
Although judicial relief eluded ASPCA, the group's attempts to
halt Ringling's abusive practices likely contributed to a decrease in
elephant abuse. For instance, the Ringling litigation put economic
pressure on circus producers to reconsider their use of wild animals in
entertainment by imposing litigation costs on Ringling, and by
producing negative publicity that will likely decrease circus
attendance. 218 Additionally, the spotlight the litigation cast on agency
non-enforcement of AWA and ESA may encourage regulators to take
enforcement action more frequently. Finally, while many elephants
may well spend the rest of their lives in chains, 219 the litigation
directly saved two elephants from the circus through a 2002
settlement agreement between Ringling and PAWS. 220
214. Id.
215. See Benjamin Adams & Jean Larson, Legislative History of the Animal Welfare Act-
Introduction, NAT'L AGRIC. LIBRARY, available at http://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/pubs/AWA2007/
intro.shtml (last modified Feb. 17, 2010).
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Circuses Facing Ban on Wild Animals, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hiluk-news/8588332.stm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (discussing a potential ban on wild
animals in circuses in the United Kingdom); Exotic Animal Incidents, BORN FREE USA
http://www.bornfreeusa.org/popups/ala-exhibited-circusincidents.php (last visited Sept. 10,
2010) (listing numerous attacks on humans by circus animals since 1990); Wild Animals in
Circuses? Questions and Answers, ANIMAL DEFENDERS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.ad-
international.org/animals-in-entertainment/go.php?id=1484&ssi=10 (last visited Sept. 10, 2010)
(listing countries that have banned using wild animals in circuses).
218. Rachel L. Einwohner, Practices, Opportunity, and Protest Effectiveness: Illustrations
from Four Animal Rights Campaigns, 46:2 Soc. PROBS. 169, 177 (1999).
219. See Undeniable Evidence, supra note 79.
220. Meet the Elephants, PERFORMING ANIMAL WELFARE SOCIETY (PAWS),
http://www.pawsweb.org/meet-elephants.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
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III. FILLING THE STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT GAPS: LEGISLATION AND
LITIGATION
A. Federal and State Legislation
While suing for the protection of circus elephants under ESA
was an innovative litigation strategy, ASPCA's suit ultimately
revealed the shortcomings of the statutory scheme designed to protect
animals in exhibition. As an attorney for the plaintiffs in the Ringling
litigation recognized, "the work really has to be done in the
legislature."221 At the federal level, Congress must strengthen AWA,
which at present may be little more than "a statement of good
intentions, delivering far more on paper than in the world."2 22 At the
state level, legislatures should enact statutes to prohibit the use of
bull hooks, the practice of chaining circus animals for extended
periods of time, and the premature removal of baby elephants from
their mothers.
Congress should revise AWA to give the Secretary of
Agriculture less discretion over enforcement decisions. At the very
least, the statute should require, rather than simply permit, the
Secretary to suspend the license of anyone found to be in violation of
the statute. 223 Additionally, statutory guidelines should constrain the
agency's discretion in determining whether a regulated party is in
violation of the statute. For example, provisions of the Act should
require the USDA to consult with an independent veterinarian when
agency investigators find wounds consistent with regular striking or
chaining of an animal. If the veterinarian confirms that abuse caused
the injuries, the Act should require the USDA to revoke the exhibitor's
license.
Furthermore, a citizen-suit provision would provide a potent
mechanism to effect real change. For years, animal advocates have
fought for a citizen-suit provision to increase oversight of animal
exhibitors and researchers and to encourage regulators to enforce the
law.2 2 4 Bills proposing a citizen-suit provision have failed in Congress
on multiple occasions, 225 probably because of the inherent difficulty in
gaining political support to amend a law that covers a vast number of
221. Confronting Barriers, supra note 90, at 65.
222. Standing for Animals, supra note 60, at 1342.
223. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2149(a) (2010).
224. Rob Roy Smith, Note, Standing on Their Own Four Legs: the Future of Animal
Welfare Litigation After Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 29 ENVTL. L. 989, 1026
(1999).
225. Confronting Barriers, supra note 90, at 65; Standing for Animals, supra note 60, at
1366.
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animals in disparate industries. 226 Therefore, to overcome political
resistance, animal advocates should propose a limited citizen-suit
provision that targets specific animal industries or restricts the cause
of action to a narrow class of potential plaintiffs.
An AWA citizen-suit provision could, for instance, apply
exclusively to claims involving animals in exhibition. A provision that
affects only exhibitors (primarily circuses, carnivals, and zoos) would
likely receive far less political resistance than a provision that would
involve the courts in regulating research. 227 Alternatively, a citizen-
suit provision could apply to a limited class of plaintiffs. In contrast
with the ESA's broad "any person" language, 228 an AWA citizen-suit
provision could simply authorize suit by any animal protection
organization. Many states already authorize humane associations to
litigate on behalf of animals. 229 The District of Columbia Circuit has
also recognized the wisdom of such a system, reasoning that when a
law purports to ensure "humaneness toward animals, who are
uniquely incapable of defending their own interests in court, it strikes
us as eminently logical to allow groups specifically concerned with
animal welfare to invoke the aid of courts in enforcing the statute."230
Enacting state laws that prohibit specific abusive practices
used231 to train elephants is another necessary step toward ending
circus elephant abuse, and public reaction to the Ringling Brothers
case may provide popular support for such laws. For example, after
an incident at the San Diego Zoo in which zookeepers beat an elephant
over the head with an ax handle, using what one abuser described as
"home run swings," the public outcry prompted the state to enact an
elephant abuse law. 2 32 The California law made it a misdemeanor to
"discipline" an elephant by, inter alia, the use of "[p]hysical
punishment resulting in damage, scarring, or breakage of skin."2 3 3 In
226. APHIS, Animal Welfare Act Information, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal
welfare/awa info.shtml (last modified April 10, 2010). The Act covers animals in exhibition,
animals in research, animals transported commercially, and certain animals bred for commercial
sale. Id.
227. Int'l Primate Protection League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 943,
940 (4th Cir. 1986).
228. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2010).
229. Confronting Barriers, supra note 90, at 66.
230. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
231. See Steven Otto, State Animal Protection Laws-The Next Generation, 11 ANIMAL L.
131, 142 (2005) (discussing an elephant cruelty case that demonstrates why state anti-cruelty
statutes need to be written in specific, objective terms).
232. WAISMAN, FRASCH & WAGMAN, supra note 9, at 418.
233. CAL. PENAL CODE § 596.5(c) (2009) (abusive behavior towards elephant); WAISMAN,
FRASCH & WAGMAN, supra note 9, at 418.
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response to the same incident, the USDA did nothing more than fine
the zoo for its violations of AWA. 2 3 4
Although Ringling's elephants frequently travel from state to
state, a law banning specific abusive practices in Florida, where
Ringling's elephants are currently bred, trained, and retired,235 would
make it difficult for the owner of America's largest Asian elephant
population to abuse its animals. 236 If Ringling's employees cannot use
bull hooks to control elephants, for example, they may lack any means
to train those elephants to perform. In that case, Ringling might need
to reconsider exploiting twelve-thousand pound exotic creatures in its
shows or, at the very least, endure the cost of moving its breeding and
training facility to another state. Although the state's animal
protection laws are not as comprehensive as California's, Florida's
citizens may be receptive to an elephant abuse law, for the state
amended its constitution by voter initiative in 2002 to prohibit a
particular form of animal cruelty used by hog farmers.237
B. Standing
While animal welfare groups would welcome the addition of a
citizen-suit provision to AWA, the Ringling litigation demonstrates
that even when a statute contains a citizen-suit provision, animal
advocates may be unable to satisfy constitutional standing
requirements. 2 38  For litigation to effectively protect animals,
advocates must clear the standing barrier. Litigants may successfully
surmount this hurdle by pursuing two promising standing theories:
informational injury and economic harm to an organization.
First, Congress should create clear statutory rights to
information in animal protection statutes so that individuals denied
information have standing to sue. 239 For instance, AWA and the ESA
could be amended to require that exhibitors governed by the statutes
make their animals' medical records available to the public. Such a
requirement would serve as the basis for constitutional standing
whenever an exhibitor failed to provide information, making it easier
234. WAISMAN, FRASCH & WAGMAN, supra note 9, at 418.
235. About the Center for Elephant Conservation, RINGLING BROS. AND BARNUM & BAILEY
CIRCUS, http://www.elephantcenter.com/?id=3624 (last visited Sept.10, 2010).
236. ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that Feld
owns fifty-four Asian elephants, the largest captive group in the United States).
237. Florida Gestation Crate Amendment Passes, PORKNET, (Nov. 7, 2002), http://www.
porknet.com/archive/110702.html#96977 (discussing the amendment banning gestation crates
which are used to confine pregnant pigs).
238. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
239. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998); Confronting Barriers, supra note 90, at 66;
Standing for Animals, supra note 60, at 1344.
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for animal advocates to establish standing.240 A disclosure
requirement might provide the additional benefits of shaming abusers
into taking better care of their animals and providing access to
information that may pertain to public health; for example, many of
Ringling's elephants have had tuberculosis, a disease communicable to
humans. 241
Second, animal welfare groups should continue to develop
theories of standing like the economic injury theory successfully
developed in Humane Society of the United States v. United States
Postal Service.242 In that case, HSUS alleged that the postal service
caused the organization economic injury when it violated AWA by
mailing a periodical that primarily served to advertise cockfighting
supplies and illegal fights. 243 The court held that the organization had
standing because it spent hundreds of thousands of dollars providing
emergency care to animals seized from illegal fights. 244 Although a
plaintiff generally cannot allege an economic injury on the basis of
voluntary expenditures, the court concluded that, if the mailings
increased "the need to care for animals on an emergency basis," the
financial injury HSUS suffered was "neither voluntary nor self-
inflicted."245 While the court's decision depended significantly on the
emergency nature of the care provided, organizations like PAWS at
least arguably suffer economic injury from the inhumane treatment of
circus elephants. Although PAWS rescues elephants voluntarily, the
financial burden it encounters increases significantly when elephants
that have suffered abuse come to its sanctuary "physically and
psychologically damaged-requiring round-the-clock monitoring and
specialized care often for the remainder of their lives."2 46
240. See, e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 (stating that a plaintiff suffers an injury in fact when
the plaintiff does not receive information that a statute requires to be disclosed).
241. Plaintiffs Will-Call Exhibit 102A-1, Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 03-
2006), available at http://www.bornfreeusa.org/ala6a-highlight.c.php (last visited Sept. 10,
2010).
242. Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 609 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2009).
243. Id. at 88-9.
244. Id.
245. Id. The court also determined that the defendant's mailing caused the injury by
increasing the number of fights and therefore the number of injured animals for which the
society had to provide emergency care. Id.
246. About our Sanctuaries, PERFORMING ANIMAL WELFARE SOCIETY, http://www.
pawsweb.org/about our sanctuaries.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although ASPCA lost its suit against Ringling, the litigation
focused attention on many problems impeding the successful
protection of circus elephants. The case highlighted the failure of
AWA to achieve Congress' purpose-to guarantee humane treatment
of animals-because the statute remains largely unenforced and
plaintiffs cannot compel enforcement. Additionally, the Ringling
litigation exemplified the recurrent difficulty animal advocates face
when attempting to overcome the standing barrier, even when
Congress has created a citizen-suit provision to grant standing to a
broad class of plaintiffs. 2 4 7
Despite the legal obstacles that prevented ASPCA from
succeeding at trial, the Ringling litigation taught a number of
valuable lessons. The suit developed standing jurisprudence by
expanding the scope of aesthetic injury to include emotional harm,
even though the court, in dismissing the case, ultimately exposed the
limitations of the theory. The litigation raised public awareness about
animal abuse at the circus as numerous news articles covered the case
and websites provided access to evidence presented at trial.2 4 8 To the
extent that attendance at traditional circuses declines as a result of
increased awareness of animal abuse, the litigation may also alleviate
elephants suffering. 249
Ultimately, the litigation is a call to action for animal rights
lawyers and advocates. When the protracted lawsuit concluded
without a decision on the merits, it became all the more clear that
alternative strategies for protecting performing elephants are
desperately needed. Legislative action at the federal and state level is
needed to overcome constitutional standing requirements that make
access to courts so elusive for representatives of animals. Such action
should include amending AWA to allow the USDA less enforcement
discretion and to include a citizen-suit provision, creating specific
state anti-cruelty laws, and providing statutory rights to information
in federal animal protection laws. Additionally, plaintiffs should
continue to pursue the novel standing theories-economic harm and
247. ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 66 (D.D.C. 2009).
248. See, e.g., Press Release, ASPCA, Animal Protection Groups Ask Federal Court to
Halt Ringling Bros.' Cruel Chaining and Confinement of Endangered Asian Elephants (May 21,
2008) available at http://www.awionline.org/ht/display/ReleaseDetails/i1l782/pid/232; Ringling
Trial Court Documents and Exhibits, BORN FREE USA, http://www.bornfreeusa.org/ala6a
courtdocuments.php (last visited Sept. 10, 2010); Ringling Trial News Stories, BORN FREE USA,
http://www.bornfreeusa.org/ala6g-press.php (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (listing newspaper
articles covering the Ringling trial).
249. Undeniable Evidence, supra note 79.
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informational injury-advanced, respectively, by HSUS 2 50 and
ASPCA. 251
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